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The paper analyzes the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court rendered on 
5 May 2020 (2 BvR 859/15, 2 BvR 980/16, 2 BvR 2006/15, 2 BvR 1651/15), wereby the latter 
heavily criticized the “democratic” legitimacy of the Public Sector Purchase Program of 
the European Central Bank (aimed, by purchasing negotiable debt securities issued by 
governments, public agencies and international institutions located in the euro area, 
to support the economy of the Member States and to increase the eurozone’s inflation 
rate up to 2%), de facto disapplying the judgment of the CGEU of 11 December 2018, 
by which that Program had been instead previously “validated.” The author places the 
decision in the context of the long-standing and conflicting relations, on the one hand, 
between Member States and European institutions and, on the other hand, between 
national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union, outlining 
the possible repercussions of the decision on a legal, economic, political and institutional 
level and, ultimately, on the very survival of the eurozone.
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Introduction
on 5 may 2020, the German Federal Constitutional Court (hereinafter also 
“Bundesverfassungsgericht” or “BverfG”) ruled on the so-called Public Sector Purchase 
Program (hereinafter “PSPP” or “PSP Program”),1 the eCB’s monetary stimulus program 
launched in 2015 and aimed, through the purchase of government bonds of the 
eurozone, to support the economies of eu member States and raise inflation to the 
2% threshold (i.e. the famous mario draghi’s “whatever it takes”). the ruling, due 
to its impact at legal, economic, political and institutional level, risks to seriously 
jeopardize the already fragile holding of the euro area. indeed, by totally disavowing 
a previous ruling of the Court of Justice of the european union (hereinafter also 
“CJeu”), which had previously deemed said program legitimate, Karlsruhe raised 
1  the official text of the decision (in German, with an official translation in english) is available at https://www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/Shareddocs/entscheidungen/de/2020/05/rs20200505_2bvr085915.
html. See, ex multis, marco dani et al., At the End of the Law: A Moment of Truth for the Eurozone and 
the EU, verfBlog, 15 may 2020 (nov. 2, 2020), available at https://verfassungsblog.de/at-the-end-of-
the-law/; Jérôme Soibinet, Legal and Political Significance of Decisions of the Karlsruhe Court. The EU in 
Search of its Legitimacy, institut thomas more (may 2020) (nov. 2, 2020), available at http://institut-
thomas-more.org/2020/05/20/legal-and-political-significance-of-decisions-of-the-karlsruhe-court/; 
Jacques Ziller, L’insopportabile pesantezza del giudice costituzionale tedesco: Sulla sentenza della Seconda 
Sezione della Corte costituzionale federale tedesca del 5 maggio 2020 relativa al programma PSPP della 
Banca centrale europea, 2 aiSdue 1 (2020) (nov. 2, 2020), also available at https://www.aisdue.eu/web/
wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Post-Jacques-Ziller-rev.pdf; diana urania Galetta, Karlsruhe über alles? Il 
ragionamento sul principio di proporzionalità nella pronunzia del 5 maggio 2020 del BVerfG tedesco e le sue 
conseguenze, 14 Federalismi.it – Rivista di diritto pubblico italiano, comunitario e comparato 165 (2020); 
Giuseppe tesauro & Patrizia de Pasquale, La BCE e la Corte di giustizia sul banco degli accusati del Tribunale 
costituzionale tedesco, osservatorio europeo (may 2020) (nov. 2, 2020), available at http://images.
dirittounioneeuropea.eu/f/sentenze/documento_dWGpi_due.pdf; Sara Poli, The Ruling of the German 
Federal Court of 5 May 2020: A Crisis Within the Crisis or a Window of Opportunity for Further Reforms in the 
EU?, eurojus, 11 June 2020 (nov. 2, 2020), available at http://rivista.eurojus.it/the-german-federal-court-
and-its-first-ultra-vires-review-a-critique-and-a-preliminary-assessment-of-its-consequences/.
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doubts, heavy as boulders, on the traceability of the PSPP within the limits of the 
eCB’s mandate, as defined by the eu treaties and, indirectly, on its compatibility 
with fundamental provisions of the German Grundgesetz. at the same time, the eCB 
was given an ultimatum (albeit indirect, as addressed, in the first instance, to the 
government, the parliament and the Bundesbank) to provide, within three months, 
detailed evidence of the proportionality of its actions, failing which the Bundesbank 
would quit that program.
1. The ECB’s Public Sector Purchase Program  
and its Previous “Validation” by the Court of Justice
the Public Sector Purchase Program, launched by the eCB with the decision of 
4 march 20152 (then amended with subsequent decisions), is part of the so-called 
Expanded Asset Purchase Program (hereinafter “eaPP” or “eaP Program”), a framework 
program for the purchase of assets on the financial market, aimed at increasing the 
eurozone’s money supply and supporting consumer spending and investments, and, 
ultimately, at stabilizing inflation around the 2% threshold. on the basis of it, the 
Frankfurt institute and the central banks of eu member States proceeded to purchase 
(according to their respective stakes in the eCB’s share capital3) government bonds 
or other negotiable debt securities issued by eu member States, by certified public 
agencies, by international organizations, as well as by multilateral development 
banks located in the euro area.
With four separate Verfassungsbeschwerden (later joined4) to the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, a series of applicants, including several German jurists, 
economists and politicians, complained about the eCB’s action in relation to the PSP 
Program, qualified as ultra vires for excess of mandate and in breach of the division 
of competences between european institutions and member States, challenging, 
morevoer, its being in conflict with the Grundgesetz (the German Constitution) for 
violation of the “democratic principle.”
By order of 18 July 2017, the BverfG referred the matter to the CJeu for a preliminary 
ruling.5 it pointed, in particular, to the potential violation of art. 123, paras. 1 and 2 
of the treaty on the Functioning of the european union (hereinafter “tFeu”) (which 
2  See decision (eu) 2015/774 of the european Central Bank of 4 march 2015 on a secondary markets 
public sector asset purchase programme (eCB/2015/10) (nov. 2, 2020), available at https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/en/tXt/?uri=oJ%3aJoL_2015_121_r_0007.
3  it is the so-called Capital Key, with the lion’s share reserved for the Bundesbank, which holds about 20% 
of the eCB’s share capital, compared, for example, to the 12% held by the Bank of italy. the PSP Program 
represented the largest share of the total value of the securities purchased under the eaPP.
4  Submitted, respectively, by Heinrich Weiss et al., Bernd Lucke et al., Peter Gauweiler and Johann 
Heinrich von Stein et al.
5  order of 18 July 2017, in the joined cases 2 Bvr 859/15, 2 Bvr 980/16, 2 Bvr 2006/15, 2 Bvr 1651/15 
(nov. 2, 2020), available at https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/Shareddocs/Pressemitteilungen/
en/2017/bvg17-070.html.
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prohibits direct monetary financing of the budgets of member States), both in 
relation to eCB’s purchases on the primary market6 and on the secondary market7, 
as well as to the possible violation of arts. 119, 127 of the tFeu and arts. 17–24 of 
Protocol no. 4 on the Statute of the european System of central banks and of the 
eCB, alleging the encroachment of the eCB actions (the mandate of which is limited, 
by the european treaties, to the area of monetary policy) on the area of economic 
policy (reserved, instead, to the exclusive competences of the eu member States) 
and, in general, a lack of proportionality between the goal pursued and the measures 
adopted, as well as a lack of adequate reasons. in the end, according to the BverfG, 
if the process of european integration (integrationsverantwortung) endorsed an 
overrun by the european institutions of their respective competences, as defined by 
the european treaties, art. 38(1), first part, of the German Constitution, which affords 
German citizens, to the extent provided for by art. 79(3), a “right to democratic self-
determination,” would be violated. it would therefore be the responsibility, on the 
one hand, of the German constitutional bodies to use all the means at their disposal 
to ensure that this process is carried out in compliance with the prerogatives of the 
eu member State and, on the other hand, of the Federal Constitutional Court to 
monitor compliance with the limes between competences, respectively, of the union 
and the German State, “disapplying” acts of the european institutions affected by 
manifest excess of mandate (ultra vires) or, in any case, prejudicial to the so-called 
“Constitutional identity” of the German legal system.
With a well-articulated decision, rendered on 11 december 2018, the CJeu 
concluded that the PSP program did not exceed the mandate of the eCB, nor did 
it violate any rule or principle of the european treaties regarding the prohibition 
of direct monetary financing.8 Specifically, after rejecting a series of objections of 
inadmissibility of the application, raised, among others, by the italian government,9 
it ruled that the eCB had fulfilled the obligation to justify its decisions10 (clearly 
6  essentially due to a communication of the details of the purchases such as to, de facto, generate the 
certainty that the eCB would directly purchase part of the bonds issued by member States, bonds 
held to maturity and therefore effectively withdrawn from the market and, and purchase negotiable 
debt securities with a negative yield to maturity.
7  essentially due to the absence of sufficient guarantees to ensure compliance with the prohibition of 
direct monetary financing and due to the impossibility of verifying compliance with certain minimum 
periods between the issuance of debt securities on the primary market and the purchase of the related 
securities on the secondary market.
8  Court of Justice, Heinrich Weiss and others, Case 493/17, 11 december 2018, eCLi:eu:C:2018:1000.
9  according to the italian Government, the questions submitted by the referring court amounted, on the 
basis of the latter’s previous statement that it would not consider the CJeu’s response to be binding, 
to an inadmissible request for an opinion instead of a decision, given that it would have ultimately 
been in the national court to decide on the validity of the eCB’s decisions, and not on the national 
measures implementing those decisions.
10  However, this obligation does not rest on the precondition, in case of institutions that enjoy a wide 
discretion, for there to be a need to identify every relevant point of fact and law (see Court of Justice, 
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giving account of its intent to deal with persistently low levels of inflation and of 
the need to resort to different and innovative tools other than “ordinary” ones to 
cope with particularly adverse economic conditions), and that the PSP Program 
should certainly qualify as a “monetary policy” action. according to the CJeu, the 
authors of the treaties did not intend to make a clear and rigid separation between 
“monetary policy” and “economic policy,” also due to the physiological suitability 
of the first type of actions to affect interest rates, bank refinancing conditions and, 
indirectly, the budgets of the eu member States:11 a monetary policy measure could 
not therefore be qualified as an (inadmissible) economic policy measure for the 
sole fact of producing effects on the latter (otherwise the eCB would be prevented 
from availing of any means made available to it by the treaties12). in assessing the 
proportionality between the goals pursued and the measures adopted, the CJeu 
then recalled that, according to the principles already enucleated by its case law, 
the broad discretion granted to certain european institutions (including the eCB) 
should be taken into account, along with the technical nature of the decisions to 
be taken and the complexity of the related assessments.13 in light of the economic 
analysis carried out by the eCB,14 the particular economic context (characterized by 
persistently low inflation, which risked triggering a cycle of deflation), as well as the 
limits and restrictions which the PSP Program was from the very beginning subject 
to,15 the Court ruled out any manifest errors of assessment on the part of the eCB or 
any manifest violations of its mandate.
Commission/Council, Case C-63/12, 19 november 2013, para. 98), nor, in the case of measures intended 
to have general scope, a need for a specific reason justifying each of the technical choices adopted 
(see Court of Justice, American Express, Case 304/16, 7 February 2018, eCLi:eu:C:2018:66, para. 76). 
according to the CJeu, moreover, from the substantial documentation relating to the various decisions 
adopted (press releases, introductory statements by the President, reports of the Governing Council 
meetings), it emerged that the eCB had carried out in-depth economic analysis, clearly highlighting 
the various options considered and the reasons for their adoption, as well as the assessment of the 
potential side effects of the PSP Program.
11  See Court of Justice, Gauweiler et al., Case C-62/14, 16 June 2015, eCLi:eu:C:2015:400, paras. 10, 78 and 108.
12  See Court of Justice, Pringle, Case C-370/12, 27 november 2012, eCLi:eu:C:2012:756, para. 56; Court 
of Justice, Gauweiler et al., para. 52.
13  See Court of Justice, Gauweiler et al., para. 68 and the case law referred to therein.
14  Suitability of the PSP Program, in the monetary and financial conditions of the euro area, to contribute 
to the achievement of the objective of maintaining price stability.
15  temporariness; limited volume of purchases through the setting of a monthly amount; priority given 
to bonds issued by private operators; limit on the eSCB’s exposure in the event of issuer insolvency; 
establishment of suitable guarantees.
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2. The Decision of the Bundesverfssungsgericht of 5 May 2020:  
The “Disapplication” of the Decision of the Court of Justice and the Review, 
on the Merits, of the ECB’s Decisions
after the CJeu’s ruling, the question of the legitimacy of the conduct of an 
independent european institution like the eCB should have been considered 
definitively settled. the CJeu is the top judicial authority within the european legal 
system: its decisions cannot be subject to any further appeal and they are final and 
binding for all authorities (not only judicial) of the member States. yet, just over 
a year after that ruling, the BVerfG not only questioned everything, but did so with 
a decision destined to have very heavy repercussions on the fragile equilibrium 
on which the european union’s architecture is based. two aspects of the decision 
are especially disconcerting at first reading. on the one hand, the decision entails 
a disavowal – almost a “delegitimization” – of the Court of Justice, whose decision of 
11 december 2018 is branded as “aus methodischer Sicht unhaltbar” (unsustainable 
from a methodological point of view (!)), “nicht nachvollziehbar” (incomprehensible (!)) 
and “objektiv willkürlich” (objectively arbitrary (!)), criticising it not so much for 
alleged violations of the Grundgesetz,16 but, mostly, and much more impertinently, 
on methodological grounds and is, eventually, de facto “disapplied,” in what appears 
to be a surprising subversion of the hierarchical relationship between the CJeu and 
national judicial authorities. on the other hand, the decision reviews, on the merits, 
the conduct of an independent european institution, with a strong stigmatization 
of its actions and decisions.
in respect of the first aspect, quite disruptive appear to be the passages in the 
reasons where BverfG addresses the issue of the relationship between the roles 
and functions of the CJeu and those of national courts, especially in relation to 
disputes involving the limits of the respective competences between european 
institutions and member States. as we know, the european legal system is based on 
the principle of conferral,17 according to which the european institutions can legislate 
or adopt other measures only within the scope of their competenceand according 
to the procedures conferred on them by european treaties.18 another fundamental 
16  Which, however, are not lacking, but appear almost in the form of an outline and are recalled almost 
exclusively to shore up the legitimacy of the Court to rule on the constitutional complaint.
17  Codified in art. 4, paras. 2, 3 and 5 of the teu. according to said provision, all the competences of the 
eu derive from a conferral expressly made by the member States. Having no “original” competences, 
the eu can only act within the specific competences outlined in the treaties; in the absence of specific 
conferral, the competence remains with the member States. on the topic, see august reinisch, The 
Division of Powers Between the EU and Its Member States “After Lisbon” in International Investment Law and 
EU Law (European Yearbook of International Economic Law) 99 (marc Bungenberg et al. eds., 2011).
18  in principle, the competences of the union are divided into exclusives (within which only the eu can 
legislate and adopt legally binding acts, while the member States can act only if authorized by the 
union, or to implement the acts of the union), concurrent or shared (within which both the eu and 
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principle is the uniform interpretation and application of eu law, guaranteed by the 
Court of Justice in constant dialogue with national judges, according to the rules 
and principles that emerge from the combined provisions of art. 119 of the treaty 
on european union (hereinafter “tue”),19 arts. 26720 and 344 of the tFue.21 according 
to the German Constitutional Court, the CJeu, in exercising of its functions, should 
comply, inter alia, with the principles and standards based on the legal (constitutional) 
traditions common to the member States22 (as emerging from the case law of the top 
courts of the member States and of the european Court of Human rights), which 
also include the principle of proportionality.23 in line with this premise, the decision 
of the CJeu of december 2018 is criticized for the “formalistic” approach adopted in 
maintaining the eCB’s conduct compliant with its mandate. Such an approach did 
not allow an effective scrutiny of the eCB’s actions (in particular, in relation to the 
impact and the effects of the PSP program on the overall economic policy of the 
euro area), debated the importance of the principle of proportionality, and emptyed 
the principle of conferral, which requires an actual supervision of the conduct of 
european institutions, in order to prevent expansions contra legem of their fields. 
the conclusion is tranchant: due to its “methodological errors,” the decision of the 
Court of Justice represents an undue crossing of its mandate and an excess of power 
in breach of art. 19, para. 1 of the teu. Since, from the point of view of the German 
legal system, it lacks the necessary “democratic legitimacy,” it cannot therefore bind 
the German Constitutional Court,24 leaving the latter free to independently and 
autonomously assess the validity of the PSP program. the challenge launched by 
Karlsruhe to Luxembourg is “spectacular”: never in history has a decision of the 
CJeu been “disapplied” by a national constitutional court because it was deemed 
ultra vires.25 rather than merely assessing the conformity of the eCB’s policies with 
the German Constitution, the Bundesverfassungsgericht arrogated to itself the right 
to assess whether the actions of a european institution comply with the european 
the member States can legislate and adopt legally binding acts; in this case the member States can 
exercise their competence only if the eu has not already exercised its own, or has decided to cease 
tout court to exercise it) and coordination (essentially aimed at coordinating the actions of the member 
States, without the possibility of leading to harmonization measures).
19  the article defines the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice.
20  the article governs the mechanism of referral for a preliminary ruling to the CJeu.
21  the provision states that member States undertake not to submit disputes concerning the interpre-
tation or application of the european treaties to any mechanism or body not covered by the treaties.
22  See art. 6, para. 3 of the teu and art. 340, para. 2 of the tFeu.
23  the principle is codified in art. 5, paras. 1, 2 and 5 of the teu.
24  Pursuant to the combined provisions of art. 23, para. 1, art. 20, paras. 1 and 2 and art. 79, para. 3 of the 
German Grundgesetz.
25  See r. daniel Kelemen et al., National Courts Cannot Override CJEU Judgments, verfblog, 26 may 2020 (nov. 2, 
2020), available at https://verfassungsblog.de/national-courts-cannot-override-cjeu-judgments/.
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treaties, an area explicitly reserved to the exclusive competence of the CJeu, thus 
literally taking its place. in fact, the judgments of the CJeu are sources of eu law, 
because they are incorporated into the interpreted rules, integrating precepts with 
immediate binding effect:26 a binding effect that represents the reflection, and at the 
same time the footing, of the primacy of the european union law over national law.27 
By escaping the constraint of the CJeu’s decision, therefore, the BVerfG effectively 
denied the primacy of european law over national law.
With reference to the second aspect (direct review, on the merits, of the eCB’s action), 
the German Court did insinuate (leaving the benefit of the doubt, which was however 
to be resolved within a period of time which in itself, although indirectly, consisted in 
imposing an ultimatum on the eCB) that the decisions taken by the eCB under the PSP 
program28 were ultra vires, i.e. beyond its mandate. according to the BVerfG, a program 
of the magnitude of the PSP has a huge impact on the eurozone as a whole and on an 
infinite variety of stakeholders, to the extent that, it allows to improve the refinancing 
conditions of member States – easing the raising of capital – while also affecting the 
capitalization and functioning of the banking system. Lastly, it affects the financial 
situation of the generality of european citizens in the various roles respectively covered 
(shareholders, owners, investors, savers, policyholders). For this very reason, it would 
have required a precise, detailed and explicit weighting of its overall economic effects, 
by balancingthe monetary policy’s objectives – falling within the mandate of the 
eCB – with the overall impact on economic and fiscal policies – which, conversely, fall 
within the competence of member States. according to the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
neither at the time when the program was launched, nor at any later time during its 
implementation, were weighting and balancing ever been adequately carried out by 
the eCB. Hence, the alleged manifest violation of the principle of proportionality and, 
consequently, the violation of the limit of its mandate.
if the assessment of the eCB’s action by the German Constitutional Court appears to 
be sligthly condescending, the ultimatum addressed to it29 is even less accomodating, 
as it is in clear conflict with the independence enjoyed by the eCB.
26  in relation to the italian legal system, the principle has been reaffirmed on several occasions by the 
Constitutional Court and the Court of Cassation. See, ex multis, it. Const. court, 19 april 1985, no. 113; 
it. Const. court, 4 July 1989, no. 389; Supreme Court (criminal division), 2 april 2009, no. 13810.
27  affirmed as of the famous judgments of the CJeu, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. 
Simmenthal SpA, Case C-106/77, 9 march 1978, eCLi:eu:C:1978:49 and Fratelli Costanzo SpA v. Comune 
di Milano, Case C-103/88, 22 June 1989, eCLi:eu:C:1989:256.
28  Specifically, that of 4 march 2015 no. 2015/774 and subsequent nos. 2015/2101, 2015/2464, 2016/702 
and 2017/100.
29  the ultimatum is rather impressive for its tone (“Following a transitional period of no more than 
three months ...”; “... unless the eCB Governing Council adopts a new decision that demonstrates in 
a comprehensible and substantiated manner ...”) and for the methods it suggests for its implementation 
(it is not the German constitutional bodies that have to demonstrate the absence of proportionality of 
the eCB’s actions, but it is the latter that has to demonstrate the proportionality of its own actions).
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the arguments used by the German Court are essentially based on a clear 
demarcation between “monetary policy” and “economic policy”30 which, although 
easy to outline in the abstract, is much less intuitive when it is put into reality. this 
demarcation, as already pointed out by the CJeu, disregards the physiological (and 
unavoidable) suitability of monetary policy decisions to have an economic impact 
(especially in the case of large volumes of purchase of securities).31 moreover, it does not 
take into account that the competences in matters of economic policy, while strictly 
not falling within the shared competences referred to in art. 4 of the tFeu, are also 
competences of the union, since, as recalled by art. 5 of the tFeu, the Council – a eu 
institution – is competent to adopt measures aimed at coordinating the economic 
policies of the member States. that distinction, in addition, although originally 
contemplated by the treaties, has gradually lost its meaning, as a result of a large-
scale monetary policy, which has increasingly brought the roles and functions of the 
eCB closer to those typical of modern central banks: from the fight against inflation to 
the prevention of deflation, from the exclusive purpose of maintaining price stability 
to the role of lender of last resort, with the aim of stabilizing the flow of guarantees 
and, ultimately, supporting the entire system financial. the argumentative short circuit 
also appears rather paradoxical: the eCB allegedly violated its mandate, limited to the 
monetary policy sector, for not having assessed the impact of this on the economic 
and fiscal policies of the eurozone, i.e. on sectors that fall beyond his mandate!
3. The Ultra Vires Acts of the European Institutions and the Prerogatives  
of the National Constitutional Courts
the complaints of the BVerfG have their roots in the theory of ultra vires acts, 
according to which the constitutional courts of the member States cannot be 
deprived of the prerogative of being involved when the “exorbitant” nature of acts 
committed by eu institutions is contested, because the foreclosure, ab origine, of any 
possible scrutiny on their part would imply the attribution, to those same institutions, 
of an exclusive authority on the treaties – which are in fact legibus soluta -, even 
legitimizing the latter’s unilateral amendments or expansions of the institutions’ 
respective competences, thus ousting the member States and their prerogatives. 
30  Such demarcation is inspired by one of the central dogmas of the German economic school known 
as “ordoliberalism,” which tends to confine the role of central banks to the control of price stability, 
relegating to the background other possible objectives, such as the pursuit of full employment or 
support to economic growth.
31  musso, Ribellione tedesca: la sentenza di Karlsruhe si abbatte su Bce, Trattati e Corte di giustizia Ue, 
atlantico Quotidiano, 6 may 2020 (nov. 2, 2020), available at http://www.atlanticoquotidiano.it/
quotidiano/ribellione-tedesca-la-sentenza-di-karlsruhe-si-abbatte-su-bce-trattati-e-corte-di-
giustizia-ue/, rightly observes: “... everyone knows that monetary policy cannot, but must, have effects 
on states-banks-savers-businesses. But, on closer inspection, the limitation applies only to the expansion 
phase, not to the recessive one. Thus, according to Karlsruhe, the policy of a central bank is ‘monetary’ only 
when recessive; when it is expansive, however, no, it becomes ‘economic’ policy, it is ‘ultra vires.’”
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this drift is prevented by the principle of conferral, by no mean affected by the 
treaty of Lisbon, which, on the contrary, reiterated the principle according to which: 
“... the Member States remain the ‘Masters of the Treaties’ and the EU has not evolved 
into to federal state.”32 the German Constitutional Court directly contributed to the 
development of this theory with its ten-year jurisprudence,33 in the wider context 
of the attempts of the constitutional courts of various member States (in the wake, 
above all, of the italian Constitutional Court, with the formulation of the so-called 
“theory of the counter-limits,”34 and of the German Constitutional Court itself, both 
with the theory of ultra vires acts35 and with the theory of “constitutional identity of 
32  See BVerfG, 05.05.2020 – 2 Bvr 859/15, rn. 123, 267, 370 and 371.
33  See BVerfG, 29.05.1974 – 2 BvL 52/71 (so-called Solange I), in which, for the first time, the principle of the 
primacy of fundamental rights of the German Grundgesetz over Community law was stated; BverfG, 
22.10.1986 – 2 Bvr 197/83 (so-called Solange II, on which see Jochen a. Frowein, Solange II (BVerfGE 
73, 339). Constitutional complaint Firma W., 25(1) C.m.L. rev. 201 (1988)), where, acknowledging the 
development of a consistent case law of the CJeu on the subject of fundamental rights (ultimately 
protected in the same way as in the German legal system) and an increase in the “democratic nature” 
of eu institutions, the German Constitutional Court ruled that it would no longer review the validity of 
the acts and provisions of european institutions (recognizing, for those cases, the exclusive competence 
of the CJeu). Following the entry into force of the maastricht treaty, however, new tensions emerged 
between the CJeu and the BverfG. in the decision of 12.10.1993 – 2 Bvr 2134/92 (known as Solange III, 
on which see Jacques Ziller, Solange III: ovvero la Europarechtsfreundlichkeit del Bundesverfassungsgericht: 
a proposito della sentenza della corte costituzionale federale tedesca sulla ratifica del Trattato di Lisbona, 
5 riv. it. dir. pubbl. com. 973 (2009)), the BverfG, while giving the green light to the ratification of the 
treaty, affirmed the principle according to which the member States are the “masters of the treaties,” 
also clarifying that the european integration process cannot escape its constitutionality scrutiny and 
its right to “disapply” the ultra vires acts of the eu (ausbrechender Gemeinschaftsakt). that principle was 
reaffirmed in the judgment on the constitutionality of the Lisbon treaty (BVerfG, 30.06.2009 – 2 Bve 
2/08, on which see anna m. russo, Il BundesVerfassungsGericht in “difesa della normalità”: la “Lissabon 
Urteil” (30 giugno 2009) e le tendenze alla ‘rigermanizzazione,’ 23 Civitas europa 123 (2009)). on this 
jurisprudential evolution see Peter Hilpold, Solange I, BverfGE 37, 291, 29 May 1974; Solange II, BverfGE 73, 
339, 22 October 1986; Solange III, BverfGE 89, 155, 12 October 1993; and Solange IV, BverfGE 102, 147, 7 June 
2000 in Judicial Decisions on the Law of International Organization 170 (Cedric ryngaert et al., 2016).
34  the term “counter-limits” was coined by the eminent scholar Paolo Barile, Ancora su diritto comunitario 
e diritto interno in VI Studi per il XX anniversario dell’Assemblea costituente 45 (1969). For an application 
of such theory see it Const. Court, 27 december 1973, no. 183 (Frontini), which stated the principle 
according to which the institutions of the (then) european Community do not have the power to 
violate neither the fundamental principles of the italian legal system, nor any inalienable human rights, 
claiming their power to judge and possibly repair such a hypothetical violation. For a critique of the 
counter-limit theory, based on the assumption that the eu, as well as the communities that preceded 
it, would form a “true” independent legal system, common also to the founding member States, see 
ezio Perillo, Noterelle sparse sulla teoria dei contro-limiti, sul Procuratore europeo, sulla Carta dei diritti 
fondamentali e la Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo, e sullo Spazio di libertà, sicurezza e giustizia, 
53(5) dir. com. e scambi int. 491 (2014). For Perillo, from the moment in which member States give up 
part of their sovereign powers and confer new legislative or governmental responsibilities to the union 
(or strengthen those it already had): “... a precise limit is created on the autonomy of individual action of 
the Member States … any ‘counter-limits’ affecting the rules of the European Union cannot be subsequently 
reintroduced at national level through the case law formulated only in some Member States, because the 
competences in question have been finally and definitely transferred to the Union and its institutions.”
35  enucleated for the first time by the BverfG, 12.10.1993 – 2 Bvr 2134/92 (so-called Solange III, see Ziller 
2009). if the theory of counter-limits prevents the eu from “invading” the core of the constitutional 
order of its member States, the ultra vires theory applies when the eu institutions “go beyond the 
boundaries of their competences.”
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the member States”36), to set impassable limits to the principle of the primacy of eu 
law, aimed at protecting the fundamental constitutional values of the respective 
legal systems.37 on the contrary, the Court of Justice has always firmly defended the 
principle according to which the validity of an eeC/eu measure, or its effects, within 
the jurisdiction of a member State, cannot be called into question by the latter by 
alleging a conflict with fundamental rights codified by its own constitution, as this 
would imply the questioning of the “legal basis of the Community itself.”38
in practice, however, the radicalism of the positions of the national constitutional 
courts has been considerably “softened” by a series of concomitant factors; 
firstly, the limitation of the inviolability of national constitutions only to some 
fundamental constitutional values;39 secondly, the conviction that the power to 
“filter” the application of eu law in light of national constitutional principles, albeit 
a monopoly of the constitutional courts (as both the German Constitutional Court40 
36  under the theory of “constitutional identity,” the constitutional identity of a member State encompasses 
the fundamental principles and values of national constitutions, in particular the protection of human 
rights and what is part of it cannot be transferred to the eu. this theory marks the boundary of 
the powers that can be transferred to (and exercised by) the eu, while at the same time acting 
as a counter-limit to the potential violation of the inalienable constitutional values of a member 
State. See BverfG, 14.01.2014 – 2 Bvr 2728/13 (Gauweiler-OMT); BVerfG, 15.12.2015 – 2 Bvr 2735/14 
(Identitätskontrolle).
37  Some constitutional courts have ruled on the constitutionality of international treaties relating to 
the process of european integration: this is the case of the Spanish Constitutional Court, with the 
declaration of 13 december 2004, no. 1 on the treaty adopting a Constitution for europe. other courts 
have ruled in the context of “ordinary” proceedings, in which the correct application of european law 
was at stake: in this sense see, ex multis, the decisions of the Conseil constitutionnel, respectively, of 
10 June 2004, 2004-496 dC (Economie numerique) and of 27 July 2006, 2006-540 dC (Droit d’auteur). 
For further information see VI Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum (armin von Bogdandy et al. eds., 
2016); Salvatore aloisio, Sul ruolo della Corte Costituzionale nel processo costituzionale europeo in 
La Corte Costituzionale e le Corti d’Europa – Atti del seminario svoltosi a Copanello (CZ) il 31 maggio – 
1 giugno 2002 375 (Paolo Falzea et al. eds., 2003); Jan Komárek, The Place of Constitutional Courts in 
the EU, 9(3) eur. Const. L. rev. 420, 433 (2013).
38  Court of Justice, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Case C-11/70, 17 december 1970, para. 3. in the 
famous decisions Van Gend & Loos (1963) and Costa ENEL (1964), the Court of Justice had stated that 
the european treaties are sui generis, which imply the supremacy of european law over all the internal 
law of the member States, including constitutional law.
39  See, in particular, BVerfG, 15.12.2015 – 2 Bvr 2735/14 (Identitätskontrolle), para. 41, where it is establi-
shed that the primacy of eu law is limited by the constitutional identity of the Basic Law which, 
pursuant to art. 23, sec. 1, sentence 3, in conjunction with art. 79, sec. 3 GG, resists and prevails over 
any constitutional amendment and the process of european integration itself.
40  in the Lissabon-Urteil (BVerfG, 30.06.2009 – 2 Bve 2/08, in particular at para. 241, the prerogative of the 
Federal Constitutional Court to review the ultra vires acts of the european institutions and to assess 
any possible violation of the constitutional identity is deemed functional to preserve the “vitality” of 
the european legal order and at the same time to ensure the application of constitutional law not 
conflicting with it; see also BVerfG, 06.07.2010 – 2 Bvr 2661/06 (Honeywell), paras. 66 and 68; BVerfG, 
15.12.2015 – 2 Bvr 2735/14 (Identitätskontrolle), para. 43. the monopoly of the Federal Constitutional 
Court also serves to prevent individual national courts from “disapplying” or ignoring eu law, because 
this would jeopardize the very integrity of eu law.
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and the italian Constitutional Court, for example in the taricco case,41 reiterated 
on several occasions), must be exercised with self-restraint, as an extrema ratio,42 in 
order to minimize cases of truly irreconcilable conflict between eu law and national 
constitutional rights;43 thirdly, the need for the “disapplication” of an eu provision 
or act to take place only after the Court of Justice has had the opportunity to rule 
on the issue;44 fourthly, the idea, which has recently emerged, that it would be the 
european treaties themselves that protect the constitutional identity of the member 
States, as both national constitutions and such treaties are based on the sharing of 
identical founding values, making it difficult to hypothesize a violation of the former 
that does not simultaneously integrate a violation of the latter.45
this would result in “converting” the power of scrutiny over eu law, in light of the 
fundamental constitutional principles, from a national “act of rebellion” to no more 
than an obligation arising from the treaties, the observance of which should be 
directly guaranteed by the Court of Justice itself (on the basis of art. 4, para. 2 of the 
teu), with all due respect to the monopoly of the national constitutional courts.46
41  See it. Const. Court, 26 January 2017, 24/2017 (Taricco), para. 6 and, previously, it. Const. Court 13 July 
2007, no. 284, 22 october 2014, no. 238 and 28 december 2006, no. 454.
42  For the Czech Constitutional Court, for example, the potential clashes between eu law and the Czech 
constitutional order would be “exceptional” and “highly improbable” (Ústavní soud, judgment of 3 may 
2006, 66/04, para. 53) and the revision of the european ultra vires acts according to the German approach 
would be more of a “warning,” but should never be used in practice. For comments, see Jan Komárek, 
Playing with Matches: The Czech Constitutional Court’s Ultra Vires Revolution, verfassungsblog, 22 February 
2012 (nov. 2, 2020), available at https://verfassungsblog.de/playing-matches-czech-constitutional-courts-
ultra-vires-revolution/; takis tridimas, The ECJ and the National Courts: Dialogue, Cooperation, and Instability 
in The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law 421 (damian Chalmers & anthony arnull eds., 2015).
43  also because of the similarity (if not identity) of the values on which both the eu treaties and national 
constitutions are based. See BVerfG, 06.07.2010 – 2 Bvr 2661/06 (Honeywell), para. 57, which calls 
for the use “… with moderation and openness to European law” of the “national” powers to review 
european acts.
44  See BVerfG, 06.07.2010 – 2 Bvr 2661/06 (Honeywell), para. 60; BVerfG, 15.12.2015 – 2 Bvr 2735/14 
(Identitätskontrolle), para. 46. Principle disregarded by the BVerfG in the decision of 5 may 2020: it is 
indeed true that the German Constitutional Court had previously seized the CJeu with a request for 
preliminary ruling, but then, not agreeing with its response, it decided to arrogate to itself the right to 
scrutinize the validity of the conduct of an independent european institution, without involving the 
CJeu to, for example, solicit clarifications on the controversial issue of the application of the principle of 
proportionality, which the italian Constitutional Court had conversely done, in the context of a different 
dispute, in the Taricco case (Court of Justice, M.A.S. and M.B., Case C-42/17, 5 december 2017).
45  according to the Polish Constitutional Court, the notion of national identity would represent 
an equivalent of the notion of “constitutional identity in the primary law of the eu”: trybunał 
Konstytucyjny ruled along the same lines in its judgment on the Lisbon treaty (on which see oreste 
Pollicino, Qualcosa è cambiato? La recente giurisprudenza delle Corti costituzionali dell’est vis-à-vis il 
processo di integrazione europea, 17(4) il diritto dell’unione europea 765 (2012)).
46  on these issues, see mónica Claes, National Identity: Trump Card or up for Negotiation? in National 
Constitutional Identity and European Integration 109 (alejandro Saiz arnaiz & Carina alcoberro Llivina 
eds., 2013), according to whom, by virtue of art. 4, para. 2 of the teu, it would be up to the CJeu to 
decide whether or not the claims of a member State based on its own Constitution should be classified 
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through a rather questionable as well as unilateral drawing of the economic 
policy choices of the member States limited to the narrow circle of the fundamental 
constitutional rights, intended as an unavoidable limes to the interference of 
european law, the verdict of Karlsruhe of 5 may 2020 seems to have swept away 
a balance that had been laboriously achieved over the years in the relations between 
the CJeu and national judges, ending up betraying the spirit of loyal collaboration,47 
codified under art. 4, para. 3 of the teu (which the BverfG itself referred to on several 
occasions48), which obliges member States to refrain from any measures that could 
jeopardize the achievement of eu objectives. the German judges also seem to 
have completely obliterated the dimension of law as a “social science,” which arose: 
“... on the basis of a conscious effort to understand society or, better, human societies.”49 
indeed, such heavy criticism of the eCB’s action, in the midst of an unprecedented 
economic crisis in european and world history, risks (should the Bundesbank really 
quit the PSPP program and, consequently, the Pandemic emergency Purchase 
Program or “PePP”, which shares the structure and purpose of the former50) to have 
devastating economic and social effects for all member countries, in particular for 
those (including italy) which are most affected by the pandemic.
in addition to the inopportune timing, the BverfG’s decision is also striking for 
its profound hypocrisy. indeed, the problems of lack of “democratic” legitimacy of 
european institutions and, in particular, of the eCB (which, shielding behind the 
principle of independence, has in fact held the reins and directed the monetary 
and economic policy of the eurozone in the last decade), are certainly nothing new; 
as “matters of eu law.” However, this outcome has been opposed by both the italian Constitutional 
Court (see it. Const. Court, 26 January 2017, 24/2017 (Taricco), para. 6) and the German Constitutional 
Court, which, in the Gauweiler-OMT – BverfG case (14.01.2014 – 2 Bvr 2728/13, para. 29), underlined 
the persistent difference between the notion of “constitutional identity” enshrined in the european 
treaties and the notion enshrined in the German Constitution, and the difference between the scrutiny 
of the Federal Constitutional Court and the review conducted by CJeu pursuant to art. 4, para. 2 of 
the teu. For comments see Franz C. mayer, Rebels Without a Cause? A Critical Analysis of the German 
Constitutional Court’s OMT Reference, 15(2) German L.J. 111, 123–124 (2014).
47  on which see voir Constantinesco, L’article 5 CEE, de la bonne foi à la loyauté communautaire in Du 
droit international au droit de l’integration: Liber amicorum Pierre Pescatore 97, 108–109 (Francesco 
Capotorti et al. eds., 1987); eleftheria neframi, La force intégrative du statut de l’Etat membre sur la 
fonction juridictionnelle in Le statut d’Etat membre de l’Union européenne: Quatorzième Journées Jean 
Monnet 333, 334 (Laurent Potvin-Solis ed., 2018).
48  See, e.g., BVerfG, 21.06.2016 – 2 Bvr 2728/13 (Gauweiler-OMT), para. 140, in which it was established 
that the coordination between the protection of common fundamental values and the respect 
for national peculiarities passes only through the cooperation between the CJeu and national 
constitutional courts, without which the process of european integration would be at risk.
49  See Pietro rossi, Scienze Sociali in II Enciclopedia delle Scienze Sociali (1997) (nov. 2, 2020), available at 
http://www.lasocietainclasse.it/letture/01.
50  the PePP, in fact, launched by the eCB precisely to cope with the economic consequences of the 
pandemic, has in principle the same characteristics as the PPSP, and is even more “flexible,” to the 
extent that it is released from the need to comply with the “capital key” criterion.
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never, however, had the judges of Karlsruhe felt so strongly the need to stand as 
champions of the “democratic principle” as an unavoidable limit to the process of 
european integration (perhaps because, in previous instances, it was the German 
legal system that was the direct beneficiary of certain unlucky eu initiatives51).
4. A “Nationalistic” Approach to the Principle  
of Proportionality
equally questionable and “forced” appears the reconstruction carried out by 
the Karlsruhe judges of the principle of proportionality, whose allegedly erroneous 
interpretation and application by the CJeu and the eCB have worked as a sort of 
workaround passkey to first escape the constraint of the decisions of the former and 
later claim the right to review, on the merits, the decisions of the latter.
By adopting, even in this case, a very uncooperative and pro-european approach, 
that principle is reconstructed not as a general principle of european law, nor is it 
interpreted in light of the Court of Justice’s case law, – as it would have been logical 
to expect in the case of a review of the conduct of a european institution – but is 
rather intended “in the German style,” in terms of Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz.52 
in other words, behind the criticisms of superficiality, lacunae and abstractness 
leveled at the judgment of the CJeu, what emerges is the conviction and the claim 
that the assessment of the existence of a proportionality between the objectives 
pursued by the PSP Program and the tools availed of should have been conducted 
according to German standards and criteria (which, however, are not always easy to 
isolate within the German doctrine and jurisprudence themselves53), these being 
only ones considered solid, reliable and probative.
Beyond the evident institutional “bullying,” this approach does not take into 
account that the drafting style of the decisions of a supranational judicial body such 
as the CJeu cannot be the same as that of a national judge: the lean, concise and dry 
style of the CJeu’s rulings partly derives from the impossibility of citing legal doctrine 
in their text to support the conclusions reached (unlike what happens for a national 
51  Karlsruhe, for instance, did not take a similar stand on the eCB’s decisions adopted in 2008 and 2011 
to raise interest rates at a time when the european economy was sliding into a first and then a second 
recession, which turned out to have destabilizing effects, especially to some Southern european 
countries. For references see roberto Cisotta, Financial Stability and the Reconstruction of the EU Legal 
Order in the Aftermath of the Crisis in european Central Bank, From Monetary Union to Banking Union, 
on the Way to Capital Markets Union: New Opportunities for European Integration, eCB Legal Conference 
2015 (december 2015), at 283, 284 (nov. 2, 2020), available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/
other/frommonetaryuniontobankingunion201512.en.pdf.
52  Galetta 2020, at 167.
53  on the German standards of the principle of proportionality see Peter Lerche, Übermass und Verfas-
sungsrecht: zur Bindung des Gesetzgebers an die Grundsätze der Verhältnismässigkeit und der Erforderlichkeit 
(1961); Walter Leisner, Der Abwägungsstaat: Verhältnismäßigkeit als Gerechtigkeit (1997).
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judge and for the German constitutional judge in particular).54 on the other hand, the 
eu and the CJeu itself are the result of a mediation between different legal traditions 
and cultures, so that the principles “borrowed” from a given system and referred 
to by the CJeu must necessarily be adapted to the needs of an enlarged union of 
States, thus acquiring their autonomy and becoming “general principles of eu law”; 
as such, they require independent interpretation and application with respect to 
national practices, also because they must be coordinated with the entire acquis 
communautaire and with the eu law provisions applicable in each specific case.
5. The Reactions and the Elapse of the Deadline  
of 5 August 2020
the “destabilizing” impact of the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s ruling obviously could 
not go unnoticed. in an unusual press release by the directorate for Communication of 
the Court of Justice,55 issued only three days after the BverfG’s ruling,56 it was reiterated 
that a judgment issued by the CJeu within a preliminary ruling’s procedure binds the 
national judge in respect of the decision to be adopted in the main “ordinary” proceedings 
and that, in order not to endanger the uniform interpretation and application of eu 
law, only the Court of Justice had jurisdiction to declare invalid or without effect the 
act(s) of a european institution to the extent it breaches eu law; entrusting national 
judicial authorities with the task and power of deciding the issue of its (their) validity 
would jeopardize the unity of the eu legal system and legal certainty.57 For its part, the 
european Commission, through an official statement from its President,58 issued in 
response to the decision of the BverfG, reaffirmed three fundamental principles: that 
the monetary policy of the union is a matter of exclusive competence of the eCB; that 
european law takes precedence over national law; that the judgments of the Court 
of Justice are binding on all judicial authorities of the member States. above all, he 
envisaged the possible opening of an infringement procedure against Germany, if the 
54  Galetta 2020, at 169.
55  this was unusual because, as mentioned in the statement itself: “The departments of the institution 
never comment on a judgment of a national court.”
56  See Press release no. 58/20 – Luxembourg, 8 may 2020.
57  in a public statement, shared with the Politico magazine, m. van der Woude, President of the General 
Court of the european union, qualified the decision of the German Constitutional Court as undue 
national interference in the functioning mechanisms of the european legal system, potentially capable 
of dismantling the rule of law in eu and to determine a “disguised” exit from the eu, without the 
formal application of the withdrawal clause provided for by art. 50 of the teu. Hans von der Burchard, 
German Court Ruling Could Tear EU Apart, Warns Senior Judge, PoLitiCo, 6 may 2020 (nov. 2, 2020), 
available at https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/05/german-court-ruling-could-tear-eu-apart-
warns-senior-judge-304373.
58  See the Statement by President von der Leyen of 10 may 2020.
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implementation of the Karlsruhe verdict would result in a violation of european law.59 
in order to examine the content and effects of the BverfG’s decision, the eCB convened 
an urgent Governing Council’s meeting, following which all the Karlsruhe complaints 
were “returned to the sender.” in fact, President Lagarde stated not only that the eCB is 
accountable only to the european Parliament and operates under the sole jurisdiction 
of the CJeu and that the ruling of the German Constitutional Court is directed solely 
at the German parliament and government, but, above all, that it will do “whatever it 
takes” within its mandate to support the economic recovery of the eurozone and pursue 
price stability: in short, Karlsruhe was completely ignored.60 these words were followed 
by facts: with the decision of 4 June 2020,61 the volume of security purchases under the 
PePP went from 750 billion euro to 1.350 billion euro, with duration extended to June 
2021 and renewal of the purchase of state’ bonds maturing at least until the end of 
2022 (in other words, an almost unlimited and perpetual support to the government 
bond market).
However, not only the european institutions, but the entire political, economic 
and legal world of the eurozone went into fibrillation after the Karlsruhe verdict (as 
evidenced by the reactions of approval or criticism, at all levels62) and, above all, so did 
59  the prospect of an imminent infringement procedure has however been fading, both because of 
the need to make all the appropriate assessments, and because it would not in any case lead to the 
annulment of the Karlsruhe verdict. For comments on a possible infringement action, see daniel 
Sarmiento, An Infringement Action Against Germany After its Constitutional Court’s Ruling in Weiss? The 
Long Term and the Short Term, eu Law Live, 12 may 2020 (nov. 2, 2020), available at https://eulawlive.
com/op-ed-an-infringement-action-against-germany-after-its-constitutional-courts-ruling-in-weiss-
the-long-term-and-the-short-term-by-daniel-sarmiento/. For more references see maciej taborowski, 
Infringement Proceedings and Non-Compliant National Courts, 49(6) C.m.L. rev. 1881, 1911 (2012).
60  the concept was reiterated by President Lagarde during a subsequent hearing in the european 
Parliament, where she affirmed that, despite being willing, when asked, to give all the necessary support 
to a member of the Governing Council, “... we will never negotiate on our independence” and that the ruling 
only concerns the PSPP – already “validated” by the 2018 CJeu’s ruling, – and not the PePP. along the 
same lines, see the statements issued to “La Repubblica” by isabel Schnabel, member of the eCB executive 
Board, on 11 may 2020, according to whom: “... we are undeterred in our willingness and ability to act. We 
will continue to conduct the PSPP and the pandemic emergency purchase program (PEPP), as well as our 
other monetary policy measures”; as well as the statement by Philip r. Lane to El Pais on 18 may 2020, 
where he affirmed that: “… we remain focused on our mandate … We are an independent central bank.” 
according to Pablo H. de Cos, Chair of the eSrB advisory technical Committee, “The decision (from the 
German court) is not, and will not be affecting ECB decisions at all.” Jesús aguado & emma Pinedo, ECB’s 
de Cos Says German Court Ruling on Debt Buying Won’t Affect Policy, reuters, 1 July 2020 (nov. 2, 2020), 
available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecb-policy-de-cos-iduSKBn2425e1.
61  eCB Governing Council’s meeting – monetary policy decisions – 4 June 2020.
62  For example, Polish Prime minister mateusz morawiecki hailed the Karlsruhe ruling as “... one of the most 
important rulings in the history of the European Union”; for Clemens Fuest, director of the iFo economic 
institute of munich, the “disapplication” of the previous decision of the CJeu by the German Court: 
“... reads like a declaration of war.” the Governor of the Bank of France villeroy and the French minister of 
economy Le maire spoke of a “Useless and dangerous attack.” Claudio Paudice, Reazione francese. Parigi 
durissima contro l’offensiva tedesca alla Bce, HuffPost, 6 may 2020 (nov. 2, 2020), available at https://
www.huffingtonpost.it/entry/reazione-francese-parigi-durissima-contro-loffensiva-tedesca-alla-
bce_it_5eb2c360c5b6114948120daf. For erik nielsen, chief economist at uniCredit, who expressed 
himself a few days before the decision, in the event that Constitutional Court would censure the 
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Germany, directly invested with the dangerous “conflict of attribution” between the 
european institutions and its highest constitutional bodies.63 the Bundestag, called into 
question by the decision, set up a commission composed of eminent German jurists and 
economists to tackle the institutional impasse, in particular to understand how to fulfil 
the BverfG’s decision (unanimously considered unavoidable) without “embarrassing” the 
eCB (as would happen by forcing it to submit to the diktats of a national judge, with the 
consequent risk of creating a dangerous precedent), while at the same time without 
violating the independence of the Bundesbank which, by constitutional dictates, cannot 
receive indications from the German government and parliament.
the “helping hand” came from the eCB, which, after declaring its willingness to 
provide the German authorities with all the relevant documents64 (many of which 
already filed with the CJeu on the occasion of the previous preliminary ruling 
procedure), – an action that did not however amount, to “issuing a new decision” as 
requested by Karlsruhe, – published a very detailed report of the Governing Council’s 
meeting of 3–4 June 2020 (formally concerning the decisions relating to the ePP 
Program, though packed with references to the PSPP launched by draghi65), aimed 
at indirectly responding to the request for “clarification” raised by Karlsruhe (as can 
be seen by the significant attention dedicated to the issue of proportionality66). 
the Bundestag and the German government were quick to state that, for them, 
eCB’s action, as later happened, “... a chaos of unprecedented proportions will fall on Europe.” elena dal 
maso, Unicredit: la Corte tedesca domani può cambiare il destino dell’Europa, milano Finanza, 4 may 
2020 (nov. 2, 2020), available at http://app.milanofinanza.it/news/unicredit-la-corte-tedesca-domani-
puo-cambiare-il-destino-dell-europa-202005040951068909.
63  For Wolfgang Schäuble, President of the Bundestag, the verdict would be “difficult to refute” (because 
independent institutions which are not democratically legitimized – and “controlled” – (such as the eCB) 
must remain strictly within the limits of their mandate), even if it risks to create a dangerous precedent 
which, if followed by other constitutional courts, could threaten the very survival of the eurozone. 
Chancellor merkel, in an interview given to 6 european newspapers (The Guardian, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
Le Monde, La Vanguardia, La Stampa, Polityka), while hoping for a composition of the clash, did not fail 
to affirm that the essence of the european project lies in the transfer of powers to the eu by member 
States and that, at present, a member State will always be able to claim particular powers unless all 
powers are transferred to the european institutions: “…which is surely not going to happen.” Philip 
oltermann, ‘For Europe to Survive, its Economy Needs to Survive’: Angela Merkel Interview in Full, the 
Guardian, 26 June 2020 (nov. 2, 2020), available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/26/
for-europe-survive-economy-needs-survive-angela-merkel-interview-in-full.
64  Balazs Koranyi & Francesco Canepa, ECB to Release Documents to Defuse German Court Challenge, 
reuters, 24 June 2020 (nov. 2, 2020), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-ecb-policy-court-
iduKKBn23v2vH: “The European Central Bank agreed to give vital documents to German authorities to 
prove the proportionality of ECB policies, two sources said, in a step to defuse a challenge threatening to 
undermine its powers to keep the euro zone together.”
65  Where it is stated that extensive literature and factual evidence have shown that the PSPP has had 
a positive impact on the macroeconomic results and on the overall economic situation of the euro 
area, confirming the effectiveness of the program in pursuing an increase in inflation.
66  With expressions such as “... the PEPP and the APP were proportionate measures under the current 
conditions for pursuing the price stability objective, with sufficient safeguards having been built into the 
design of these programs to limit potential adverse side effects, including risks of fiscal dominance, and 
to address the monetary financing prohibition.”
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the documentation was satisfactory,67 passing the ball, for the final assessment of 
proportionality, to the Bundesbank68 (which, ironically, had been, during draghi’s 
tenure, the most bitter antagonist of the PSP Program). President Weidmann, likely 
induced to milder advice by the pressure received to settle the conflict, finally 
declared that the documentation provided met the requirements requested by 
Karlsruhe, thus putting an end to the dispute.
in short, a “pragmatic, sensible”69 and “elegant”70 way out was found (even though, 
for some, the eCB has not answered at all71 and the whole procedure has been 
a farce72); the feeling, however, is that the problem, far from having been definitively 
resolved, has simply been postponed.
6. Future Scenarios
undoubtedly, the decision of the German Constitutional Court calls into question 
a multiplicity of issues relating to the process of european integration, from a legal 
point of view (the relationship between national constitutions and european 
treaties,73 as well as the relationship between the Court of Justice and national 
67  See German Lawmakers Conclude eCB Has met Court requirement on Stimulus: draft document, uS 
news money, 29 June 2020 (nov. 2, 2020), available at https://money.usnews.com/investing/news/
articles/2020-06-29/german-lawmakers-conclude-ecb-has-met-court-requirement-on-stimulus-draft-
document. according to minister of Finance olaf Scholz, who sent directly to Karlsruhe a positive 
opinion that the Bundesbank continues to participate in the acquisitions of eurosystem bonds, the 
proportionality test of the eCB’s performance had been successfully passed.
68  as confirmed by a statement by the German Constitutional Court, according to which it was eventually 
for the Bundesbank to decide, independently, if the Karlsruhe verdict could be considered fulfilled as 
to the compliance with the principle of proportionality, after the relevant documentation was sent 
by the eCB: “The Federal Constitutional Court is no longer involved” (Judge Peter Huber at the FaZ). See 
Bundesbank must decide on eCB Bond Purchases, top Court Judge Says, reuters, 28 June 2020 (nov. 2, 
2020), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-germany-court-ecb/bundesbank-must-decide-
on-ecb-bond-purchases-top-court-judge-says-iduKKBn23Z0u9.
69  olli rehn, Governor of the Finnish Central Bank to the German newspaper Handelsblatt. Governor olli 
rehn: interview in Handelsblatt, Suomen Pankki, 1 July 2020 (nov. 2, 2020), available at https://www.
suomenpankki.fi/fi/media-ja-julkaisut/puheet-ja-haastattelut/2020/governor-olli-rehn-interview-in-
handelsblatt-1-july-2020/.
70  Carsten Brzeski, economist of inG-Bank.
71  Christian Siedenbiedel, EZB-Rat gibt Weg für Kompromiss mit Verfassungsgericht frei, Frankfurter 
allgemeine Zeitung, 25 June 2020 (nov. 2, 2020), available at https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/
ezb-rat-gibt-weg-fuer-kompromiss-mit-verfassungsgericht-frei-16832513.html, according to whom 
the eCB allegedly: “… badly ignored the sentence.”
72  Jürgen Stark, former chief economist of the eCB at the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 July 2020, 
according to whom, given the short period of time between the arrival of the documentation and the 
formation of the positive opinion, no actual examination has ever been carried out by the government 
and the Bundestag. along the same lines, see Prof. murswiek, legal counsel representing one of the 
successful applicants on 5 may 2020 (see infra note 86).
73  For references see enzo Cannizzaro, EU Law and National Constitution: A Pluralist Constitution for 
a Pluralist Legal Order?: National Report – Italy in 1 F.I.D.E. XX Congress, London, 30 October – 2 November 
2002 134 (Gordon Slynn & mads t. andenæs eds., 2003).
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judicial authorities), a political-institutional point of view (the principle of the eCB’s 
independence and the plausibility of an allocation of competences between the eu 
and the member States based on the distinction between “monetary” and “economic” 
policies) and from an economic perspective (the very survival of the eurozone). more 
generally, it resurrects the age-old question of the purely intergovernmental or truly 
supranational nature of the complex european architecture. although questionable 
for its timing and methods (this being far from the best time to proceed with 
a rethinking of such complex balances, with the eu facing the most serious health 
and economic crisis in its history on one hand and Brexit on the other, and facing 
geopolitical tensions on various fronts, including the relationship between the uSa 
and China, the conflict between Greece and turkey, etc.). the decision, nevertheless, 
has the merit of having brought back to the center of the debate the most decisive 
(and undoubtedly most thorny) issue concerningthe european integration process, 
the solution of which, too often postponed due to opportunism, conflicts of interests 
or “quiet living,” is perhaps no longerdeferrable.
the first problem is the question of independence of the eCB.74 the “classic” 
paradigm, which emerged from the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the 
need to anchor prices during the Great inflation of the 1970s, has now been shattered.75 
When it arose, it was mainly aimed at removing the determination and control of 
monetary policy from the grip of politicians, excessively conditioned by short-term 
concerns (strengthening consensus through policies aimed at full employment, at 
the expense of containing inflation). the independence of central banks then had the 
purpose of “protecting” them from the influence and interference of the legislative 
and executive powers, giving them a status aking to that of the judiciary, in order to 
allow them to set monetary policies in a “counter-majority” and long-term perspective, 
so as to establish a permanent climate of confidence in monetary stability. the main 
goal was to keep inflation low. over the years, however, the need to address new 
and different priorities (low economic growth, unemployment, deflation, instability 
of the financial system, poor success of governmental fiscal initiatives) has seen an 
exponential growth of their interventionism (with significant repercussions to the 
74  on this issue see rené Smits, The European Central Bank’s Independence and Its Relations with Economic 
Policy Makers, 31(6) Fordham int’l L.J. 1614, 1624 (2017); matthias Goldmann, Adjudicating Economics? 
Central Bank Independence and the Appropriate Standard of Judicial Review, 15(2) German L.J. 265 (2014); 
Stefanie egidy, Judicial Review of Central Bank Action: Can Europe Learn from the United States? in european 
Central Bank, Building Bridges: Central Banking Law in an Interconnected World, eCB Legal Conference 2019 
(december 2019), at 53 (nov. 2, 2020), available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.ecbl
egalconferenceproceedings201912~9325c45957.en.pdf?258d648ffcf1be39f9d927e5c13f393f; Lars Bay 
Larsen, Legal Bridges over Troubled Waters? Standard of Review of ECB Decisions by EU Courts in Id. at 47; 
Chiara Zilioli, The Standard of Review of Central Banks Decision: An Introduction in Id. at 23.




level of prices and incentives, the public debt market, social redistribution, market 
competitiveness and so on),76 which, however, was not matched by an increase in 
their “democratic legitimacy.” Central banks are the true “demiurges” of the economic 
system, but they are not-elected bodies, removed from any control or supervision, 
on the merits, of their action.77
the question posed by Karlsruhe is all here: if european economic policy is, 
de facto, determined by the eCB, not elected and not controlled by any higher 
authority, what is the point of talking about “sovereignty that belongs to the people,” 
who exercise it in the forms provided for by national constitutions? to “normalize” 
this situation, sporadic actions to increase the transparency of its decisions will not 
be satisfactory. it would be necessary to start considering a substantial reform of 
the treaties (amending, to begin with, art. 130 of the tFeu), to lay the foundation 
for a “financial constitution,” with the introduction of mechanisms capable of 
democratically legitimizing the eCB (a different role of the european Parliament, 
the possible creation of an eu Finance minister, etc.).
With this, we come to the perhaps most challenging question raised (indirectly) 
by the Karlsruhe judges: what the eu wants to become “when it grows up.” in the 
long term, lingering in the current institutional limbo seems no longer sustainable: 
either member States opt for a real monetary union (which would, however, imply 
a “Copernican revolution” of the eurozone, with fiscal transfers, mutualisation of 
debt, common taxation, a central bank lender of last resort ...), or, at the opposite 
end, opt for an orderly and coordinated dismantling of the single currency, with the 
return to the pre-maastricht situation (and, for individual states, to their respective 
monetary sovereignty).78
the first option appears, at present, to be illusory. Beyond the slogans about the 
“european dream and family,” many member States have mutually irreconcilable 
interests (and needs). there has been, since the time of Helmut Kohl,79 a traditional 
German hostility towards any hypothesis of mutualisation of debt. on the other 
hand, it is undeniable that, at the moment, member States need different monetary 
76  as regards the eCB specifically, for example, the single supervisory mechanism created in 2013 has 
expanded its functions, giving it a sort of implicit mandate (because based on a forcibly expansive 
reading of art. 127, para. 6 of the tFeu) for the pursuit of financial stability. in addition, through long-
term refinancing operations (Ltros and tLtros) and other securities purchase programs, launched 
from 2011 to stabilize the financial markets during the banking crisis that hit the eurozone, the eCB 
has been playing an increasingly important role in the allocation of credit.
77  unlike the ministries of the treasury, whose action in the fields of taxation and public spending is 
limited, conditioned and monitored by the respective parliaments, according to the principle of “no 
taxation without representation.”
78  See marco dani et al., supra note 1.
79  Helmut Kohl had overcome the Germans’ reluctance to abandoning the deutsche mark in favour of 
the euro by promising that the eCB would never directly finance the public debts of member States 
and that there would never be a mutualisation of debt.
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policies.80 after years of trade surplus and rates close to zero (if not negative), 
Germany and its satellite states need to inflate their economy, to reverse the negative 
yields for government bonds, savings deposits, pension funds, real estate and equity 
speculative bubbles; therefore, they’d need more stringent monetary rules and 
a self-restraint of purchases by the eCB. Conversely, countries such as France, italy 
and Spain need more flexibility and an expansive policy from the eCB: high interest 
rates would mean, for these states, an explosion of public debt and even the risk 
of default.81
in this context, in the absence of an imminent (and completely unlikely) 
amendment of the treaties, what scenarios are on the horizon after the ruling of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court of 5 may 2020? although the eCB-Bundesbank 
conflict has been, for the moment, “diplomatically” defused, the principle enshrined 
in the BverfG’s decision remains fully in force: the German constitutional bodies are 
called upon to constantly monitor the eCB’s actions, and the Bundesbank has a sort 
of (indirect) veto power within the eCB, to be exercised (through the threat of an exit 
from the program) whenever those actions appear “disproportionate” or in conflict 
with the German Constitution: in short, timer for the explosion of the eurozone 
activated. a progressive alignment of the eCB to the “restrictive” positions invoked 
by Karlsruhe, with consequent compression of purcahse volumes, would be fatal for 
many states (including italy), which would be forced, in order to remain in the euro 
area, to resort to much more expensive forms of financing (placing their securities on 
the market at consistently higher rates, with relative harm to their public finances, or 
submitting to programs with heavy conditionality – Troika à la grecque, so to speak, – 
which could even contemplate debt restructuring, with unpredictable social effects); 
or, alternatively, to abandon the eurozone, with consequences that are difficult to 
imagine, in order to regain monetary sovereignty and use internal monetary leverage 
to proceed with expansive economic policies aimed at reviving their economy.
if, on the other hand, the eCB decides to continue undaunted on the path of 
unlimited purchase of public debt securities (i.e. at present the most probable 
80  as recently stated by François villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, on the occasion 
of an online speech at France’s Société d’économie politique. Some euro Zone Central Banks need to 
do more, others Less: eCB’s villeroy, reuters, 25 may 2020 (nov. 2, 2020), available at https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-ecb-policy-villeroy/some-euro-zone-central-banks-need-to-do-more-others-
less-ecbs-villeroy-iduSKBn2311uG.
81  indeed, twenty years after the introduction of the single currency, the economic differences between 
member States, which it was hoped would be reduced over time, have instead increased. this was 
recently highlighted by Klaas Knot, Governor of the dutch Central Bank, during a HJ Schoo lecture 
“‘emerging from the Crisis Stronger together’ – How We Can make europe more resilient, Prosperous 
and Sustainable,” held in amsterdam on 1 September 2020 (nov. 2, 2020), available at https://www.
bis.org/review/r200922c.pdf. according to Knot, the absence of an exchange rate between euro 
countries proved to be an advantage for stronger economies (thanks to an increase in exports, an 
increase in trade surplus, higher operating profits for companies and the consequent increase in tax 
revenues for the state), but a disadvantage for weaker economies.
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option, according to its most recent monetary policy decisions82), a future exit of 
the Bundesbank from the eCB’s programs (after the disposal of the bonds already 
purchased) cannot be excluded, which would likely lead, in the long term,83 to the 
break-up of the eurozone84 and to the possible creation, even within a persistent 
single market, of two distinct monetary areas (on the one hand, Germany and 
satellite states with the “strong” euro; on the other, France, italy and “southern” states, 
with a “weak” euro), among which the first thing to be abolished would be the free 
movement of capital,85 which represents both the essence and the goal of a single 
currency; in any event, it would be the end of the euro as we know it.
Finally, the question remains of how Karlsruhe will react to the umpteenth appeal 
filed by the successful claimants on 5 may, understandably dissatisfied with the 
turn taken by the Karlsruhe-eCB clash.86 it is unlikely that the German Constitutional 
Court, after the agreement found by all the German constitutional bodies on the 
same “compromise solution,” will be willing to question everything, having already 
declared that the last word on the passing or failing of the proportionality test would 
in any case belong to the Bundesbank.87
anyway, Pandora’s box has now been opened and it is perhaps only a matter of 
time for the Gordian knot of the unresolved relations between the european union 
and the member States to be finally untied.
82  See Christine Lagarde & Luis de Guindos, Introductory Statement – Press Conference, european Central 
Bank, 16 July 2020 (nov. 2, 2020), available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2020/
html/ecb.is200716~3865f74bf8.en.html: “We will never let capital key convergence that will take place 
at some stage impair the efficiency of the monetary policy that we have to deploy.”
83  Because, in principle, in the short term, the purchase plan could continue with a takeover by the other 
central banks in the purchases made by the Bundesbank. But it is clear that a “BuBa exit“ would be 
politically disruptive.
84  during one of the many meetings that took place at the Bundestag after the ruling of 5 may 2020, 
answering the precise question posed by a m.P. on what would happen to the euro if the Bundesbank 
were to withdraw from the eCB’s public bond purchase programs, Prof. d. meyer (Helmut-Schmidt-
universität, universität der Bundeswehr in Hamburg) replied, apertis verbis, that the single currency 
would simply no longer exist.
85  this is because the Bundesbank could not accept to suffer the effects of a monetary policy (i.e. accep-
ting euro circulated by other central banks) to which it remained extraneous, and would very likely 
proceed to regulate and/or limit the entry of capital fleeing from Southern european countries into 
Germany of, in order to avoid speculative bubbles and allow a rise in rates in Germany.
86  the request, already submitted, for access to the documents (in relation to part of the documentation 
made by the eCB available to the Bundestag, the government and the Bundesbank by the eCB, but 
classified for the applicants), will probably be followed by an application for an executive order of 
the decision of 5 may (Vollstreckungsanordnung). as stated on several occasions by Prof. d. murswiek, 
legal counsel representing one of the applicants, no proportionality test according to the parameters 
indicated by the Federal Constitutional Court has ever actually been carried out by the eCB. according 
to murswiek, in the documentation sent by the eCB there is no quantification, or even an approximate 
indication, of the order of magnitude of the advantages and disadvantages of the PSP Program. in 
the absence of any quantification, no real and actual weighting of the proportionality of the eCB’s 
action could be possibly carried out.
87  See supra note 68, statement by Judge P. Huber, according to whom: “The Federal Constitutional Court 
is no longer involved.”
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